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Abstract
This thesis examines how the institutional practices put forth by the
emergency management community have impacted the health equity of
marginalized groups of people, such as the Black community of New Orleans
during Hurricane Katrina, and how that has in turn, impacted community equity
and development following the event. Specifically, this thesis analyzes the impact
Hurricane Katrina and its emergency response had on the marginalized
community’s health equity. Following the events of Hurricane Katrina, I will
analyze two similar events that followed Hurricane Katrina -- Hurricane Sandy
and Hurricane Maria -- in order to observe the changes made within emergency
management when it comes to decision-making in response methods that
disproportionately impact marginalized communities that face discrimination
due to race. Finally, after contextualizing the changes within emergency
management that have occurred over time, I will create an outline for an
awareness training program for emergency management personnel that will
focus on remedying and changing past institutional-based emergency
management practices that have negatively impacted marginalized communities
in their journey towards emergency situation recovery.
The overarching goal of this thesis is to create response awareness
within the emergency management community and mitigate future
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institutional discriminatory practices such as racism within emergency response
and recovery. While this thesis is a critique of emergency response and
recovery, it is meant to be a means of showing necessary areas of improvement
within emergency management in order to better meet the needs of
communities.
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Literature Review
Environmental related disasters strike indiscriminately, impacting
communities regardless of economic influence, racial background, or existing
inequalities present in a particular region. This makes it imperative to
understand how those disaster events, both human and environmentally
caused, relate to the health equity and development of communities, more
specifically marginalized communities that face institutional discrimination,
particularly from governmental and nongovernmental agencies that aid in
emergency response. The main topic that will be addressed in this thesis is how
systemic racism and systematic procedural practices within emergency
management impact the health equity and development of marginalized
communities (specifically BIPOC communities).
When it comes to emergency management and approaches to addressing
emergency disasters, assessing the risks associated with all aspects of the
communities affected by the event are required for the response and recovery
methods used to be successful. Louise Comfort in Crisis Management in
Hindsight: Cognition Communication, Coordination, and Control describes a
whole community approach to emergency management by saying, “a critical
component of emergency response is cognition—that is, the capacity to
recognize the degree of emerging risk to which a community is exposed and to
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act on that information” (Comfort, 2007). What Louise Comfort describes as
cognition, is in essence what the goal of this thesis is – to address how the risks
and struggles associated with communities in emergency and disaster situations
are not always considered or acknowledged in emergency response and recovery
and then how to change those practices to better meet community needs.

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (FEMA)
The idea revolving around meeting communal needs and having a holistic
approach to emergency management is not a new concept and methods on how
to do so have been consistently re-evaluated by members of the emergency
management community. However, with that said, the ways in which emergency
management agencies and personnel have approached addressing risks
associated with communities, along with meeting the needs of those
communities in a sustainable way, can always be improved.
When it comes to addressing emergency disasters within the United
States, the main agency that is involved in that process is the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, also known as FEMA. FEMA has set the groundwork for
assessing emergencies and disaster recovery, including setting up a system of
how government organizations and non-governmental organizations such as the
Red Cross, interact with one another when responding to crises on a multi-
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organization level (FEMA National Incident Management System, 2020). In
regards to this project, assessing the interworkings of how different entities
within the emergency management community interact with one another is
essential to understanding what areas of improvement are needed in response
and recovery efforts. The NIMS document outlines protocols and procedures in
how to go about responding to emergencies and events that cause catastrophic
damage to both human life and human infrastructure. The National Incident
Management System as a whole acts as a response and mitigation guide for
governmental, nongovernmental, and private agencies to holistically address any
kind of emergency incident from a team-work point of view. Specifically, NIMS
articulates specific protocols, procedures, structures of command, and ways for
multiple agencies to effectively communicate and work together to address an
incident. The NIMS structure is important to understand when studying
emergency management, as every incident has multiple agencies that are
funded in different ways and working together, which can dramatically impact
the effectiveness of response, the acquisition of resources for communities, the
timeliness of casualty mitigation, along with community recovery as a whole
(National Incident Management System, 2020).
In order to help navigate the structural and systematic processes that go
into acknowledging and following the National Incident Management System,
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FEMA specifically has an outlined plan to highlight the agency's goals when it
comes to assisting in emergency response and recovery. This document, FEMA’s
strategic plan for 2018-2022, states FEMA’s national priorities when it comes to
helping create a culture of preparedness and effective disaster response within
the nation. The plan articulates how FEMA will go about meeting its goals on a
community level, mainly highlighting communication within multiple agencies
and communities, along with acknowledging the importance of communal
representation within the agency and its personnel. The document explains this
by stating, “resilient and redundant all-hazards communications capabilities are
an indispensable element of emergency management and must be built into
catastrophic preparedness efforts. If we cannot effectively and reliably
communicate with our partners, we cannot coordinate with them and we cannot
direct Federal support to where it is needed most” (FEMA Strategic Plan, 2020).
FEMA’s strategic plan overall communicates the agency’s fundamental
mission and priorities, which is important to reference when studying possible
successes and failures in meeting the needs of communities and overall flaws in
emergency response. In the document it states FEMA’s top three goals to be:
building a culture of preparedness, readying the nation for catastrophic disasters,
and reducing the complexity of FEMA. Within each of these goals, there are more
specific objectives that the agency outlines to meet those goals, some of which
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include improving the agency’s modes of operation and capabilities in regards to
emergency management along with improving the National Disaster Recovery
Framework. The strategic plan outlines this by saying, “to be effective together,
we must be able to quickly mobilize, scale, and integrate this workforce to meet
the needs of impacted communities” (FEMA incident management personnel).
In regards to the project, the FEMA Strategic Plan specifically outlines the
specific goals and objectives of FEMA following all three of the disaster events of
study for this thesis (Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Sandy, and Hurricane Maria).
Therefore, giving insight on the action methods put forth by the agency to alter
its emergency response practices following those specific events. While the
Strategic Plan document does mention the importance of diversity and
inclusion, the topic of diversity and inclusion is only mentioned on a
demographic level within the agency - such as reinforcing the importance of
having a diverse staff to meet the needs of communities in a crisis. The
document highlights this by articulating, “as an agency, diversity and inclusion is
a key component in our ability to serve all people. We must continue to employ
and retain diverse staff and coordinate with the whole community of emergency
managers to ensure that the needs of the entire population we serve are
considered” (FEMA Strategic Plan, 2020).
Overall, while FEMA’s Strategic Plan does talk about diversity and
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inclusion, the document does so very briefly and does not explicitly mention
the importance of having emergency management personnel that represent
the communities the agency is assisting in emergency situations. Along with
this, the FEMA strategic plan does not mention specific awareness training
programs for emergency management personnel to participate in to address
bias, prejudice, and harmful practices within the agency. When it comes to
meeting the needs of the community, FEMA has a clearly laid out plan to do
so, however, addressing inequities and discrimination in regards to emergency
response needs to be explicitly a part of that process in order to have more
equitable emergency management practices (Willison et al., 2019).
This thesis incorporates an outline for an awareness training program that
will focus on past failures and successes in institutional based emergency
management practices in meeting the needs of communities, specifically
marginalized communities. The training highlights the importance of working
towards remedying harmful practices in future emergency situations, making it
imperative to understand the risks associated with different communities, and
also acknowledging the areas of emergency response that need to be improved
in order to address community needs. Whether that is increased funding for
emergency response, more emergency response personnel present in the
affected areas, or otherwise.
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Event 1: Hurricane Katrina (2005)

Hurricane Katrina disproportionately impacted communities of color, not
only because the storm happened to hit those neighborhoods hardest and cause
significant damage, but also because the emergency response programs put in
place had the impact of exacerbating inequality. Understanding how inequality
within emergency response is impacting marginalized communities is essential to
creating more equitable and proactive emergency management practices. An
essential aspect of emergency management is having the ability to recognize
posed risks a community faces, then proactively responding to it, and this should
include the recognition of risks that emerge due to emergency response decisionmaking, not just solely the risks that coincide with a particular disaster unfolding
(Comfort, 2007). The Hurricane Katrina disaster is just one of the many examples
of how institutional based practices within emergency management impact
existing racial inequalities, and is an awakening for greater change within the
emergency community to better meet the needs of communities.
On August 25th 2005, Hurricane Katrina initially made landfall in the state
of Florida as a category 1 hurricane. Overtime, Katrina built up enough
momentum to become a category 5 hurricane, earning a reputation for being one
of the most destructive and devastating natural disaster events to ever occur on
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U.S. soil. Population data provided by the United States Census Bureau shows
that marginalized and minority communities, specifically the Black community,
were disproportionately impacted by the destructive nature of Hurricane Katrina
compared to the White community. The disproportionate impact of Hurricane
Katrina on communities of color, is most notably present in the New Orleans
Parish of Louisiana. The 2000 census data shows that within a total population of
484,674 people, 325,947 of the total population of the New Orleans Parish were
Black, whereas only 128,871 of the total population was White (Census, 2000).
Roughly 67% of the population in New Orleans was Black in 2005 when Hurricane
Katrina hit and began its destructive wake on the city, hence showing that a
disproportionate amount of Black community members was negatively impacted
by Hurricane Katrina, not just in its destruction, but also socioeconomically
(Census, 2015).
Reviewing the Census data, White residents of New Orleans also tended to
live in places that were less severely affected by Hurricane Katrina. Shown in a
visual manner, Figure 1 displays the location of solely the White population in the
New Orleans area, whereas Figure 2 displays the areas of New Orleans greatly
impacted by Hurricane Katrina - specifically through the flooding of city and
residential infrastructure (Census, 2000).
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Figure 1: White Community Presence in New Orleans, LA

Figure 2: Minority Presence in New Orleans, LA
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Figure 3: Flood Map of Hurricane Katrina Highlighting Areas Most Affected

Figure 1 shows the population of New Orleans broken down by race. The
areas to the northwest of Mid-City and to the far east are the neighborhoods
with the highest percentages of white residents (over 75% of the residents of
these neighborhoods are white). The areas between these two neighborhoods
are predominantly people of color, making up the vast majority of the city’s
residents. This is most prominently seen in Figure 2, which highlights the
presence of BIPOC residents of New Orleans.
Combining the Census data on race with the flooding map in Figure 3, we
can see that the majority of the White population of New Orleans was less
severely impacted by Hurricane Katrina through the storm’s flood pathway
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through the city. Comparing the water level in areas where there were more
members of the Black community located and where members of the White
population were located in the city and where the flooding caused the most
damage, emphasizes the disproportionate way in which the hurricane affected
certain communities (Swenson, 2019). The data displayed on Figure 3, while
showing the flood height in the New Orleans area, does not show this in of itself.
Reviewing Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 together displays that the Black
population was more severely impacted by flooding because the majority of the
Black population was located in areas in which the storm flooded the city with
the most water, given the height of the flooding during the hurricane (Census,
2000, Swenson, 2019).
Overall, any natural disaster or public health concern will inevitably cause
destruction to building infrastructure and impede on human activity, including
community growth and presence in an area. Hurricane Katrina drastically
affected the presence of certain communities - particularly marginalized
communities - in the New Orleans area (Census, 2015). Census data show that
during both 2005 and in 2014 the Black population was the most prominent
group present in the New Orleans area both before and after the hurricane
(Census, 2015). However, due to the destruction and flooding caused by the
hurricane, housing accessibility, business presence, and employment all
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decreased, negatively impacting the economy and overall community (Census,
2015). In the year 2005, housing units were at a total of 582,800 within the New
Orleans area. By 2006, one year after the hurricane occurred, there was a
decrease to a total of 438,278 units. Fast forwarding to the year 2014, the
housing units available were more than the units available right after the
hurricane, however, even years following the event, the amount is still
significantly lower than the initial 2005 total by thousands of housing units. In
2014, the total housing units in the New Orleans area was at 553,627 (Census,
2015), a decrease of nearly 30,000 units. The numerical patterns in the census
data in regards to employment and established businesses are similar in that
there are still fewer businesses and working individuals in the New Orleans area
than the amount present in 2005 before the hurricane hit (Census, 2015). The
number of established businesses in 2005 was at a total of 31,401, whereas in
2006 that number decreased to 29,002 after the storm. In 2013, the number of
established businesses was still fewer than the 2005 value at 29,794. The number
of working individuals in 2005 was at a total of 517,194, whereas in 2006 that
number also decreased to an astounding 427,373. Currently in 2013, the rate of
employment is still lower than the number present in 2005 before the hurricane
at a value of 475,098 (Census, 2015).
The data discussing the change in housing units, employment, and
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established businesses within the New Orleans area before, directly after and
long after Hurricane Katrina occurred, indicates that the overall city community
was impacted severely socially and economically after the event. There was less
housing, jobs, and functioning business in the area, making it harder to live in
New Orleans as there were less opportunities to successfully live in the area
without facing significant hardships, prompting members of marginalized
communities such as the Black community to leave New Orleans and not return even long after Hurricane Katrina. Figure 4 (below) visually displays the impact
Hurricane Katrina had on the overall population, housing, and employment
(Census, 2015).
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Figure 4: Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Population, Housing, and Employment

Due to the decrease in housing, businesses, and job accessibility, the
functionality of the economy was in decline after Hurricane Katrina, promoting a
chain of decline in an array of different amenities and resources, also
contributing to the seen displacement and decline of certain populations of
people in the area. Some of these amenities were the number of grocery stores,
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gas stations, pharmacies, hotels, and overall city infrastructure construction after
the hurricane occurred (Census, 2015). The number of grocery stores available
decreased from 573 in 2005 before the hurricane to 430 in 2006, only minorly
increasing to 461 in 2013. The number of accessible pharmacies similarly
decreased from 221 in 2005 to 165 in 2006, also only having a minor increase in
2013 to be at a number of 193. Overall, the construction of buildings for
residential housing decreased, where interestingly the construction of
nonresidential buildings increased, however, overall staying stagnant between
2006 and 2013. All of these factors have promoted the reduction of community
presence and retention in the New Orleans area and are also social determinants
for disparities to occur among communities - particularly the Black community as
it was the most prominent group in the area and the most vulnerable to the
Hurricane Katrina disaster (Census, 2015).
A major disaster such as Hurricane Katrina requires the rebuilding of
communities and resources after that event, and the rebuilding of the New
Orleans area, communities, and reintegration of resources available was
significantly stagnant after the hurricane - even long after it occurred. With
having less access to certain amenities such housing, grocery stores for food
security, pharmacies, and businesses to create jobs and secure employment,
marginalized communities within the New Orleans area suffered and continue to
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suffer as there are more barriers when it comes to getting equitable access to
such amenities, exacerbating both racial and health disparities (Census, 2015).
Without access to pharmacies, it is difficult to meet basic medicinal needs and
with the combination of less access to housing and grocery stores for food, the
overall health of communities’ decline - particularly those who are marginalized
and discriminated against due to race, as health and racial disparities
consequently intersect with one another. Since Hurricane Katrina hit New
Orleans, the income gap between the Black population and White population has
increased to about 37 percent, an astounding rate. Along with the raised income
gap, the overall Black population in New Orleans has decreased by at least
100,000 residents, if not more since the storm initially hit in 2005, suggesting that
the disparities seen by the Black population in New Orleans since Hurricane
Katrina, is significant and should not be overlooked (Democracy, 2015). The
income gap is one of the many growing racial disparities seen in the New Orleans
area, and many of them have yet to be addressed.
Before Hurricane Katrina hit, in 2003 poverty rates in New Orleans were
high, where roughly 448,216 individuals within the area were at poverty status
(Census, 2005). After the hurricane hit in 2005, roughly one fifth (20 percent) of
the population fully displaced by the hurricane overall were poor and were at
poverty status (Gabe et al., 2005). The Hurricane Katrina event overall
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disproportionately impacted the Black community in New Orleans compared to
other communities present in the area at the time of the storm (Gabe et al.,
2005). The Black community alone made up 44 percent of the individuals
impacted by Hurricane Katrina, showing that poverty, home displacement, and
livelihoods overall within the Black community were significantly more impacted
by the storm as there was growth in health and racial inequities that continued to
persist after the hurricane occurred that was then compounded by the
emergency response to the storm (Gabe et al., 2005).

Overall, in regards to successes and failures in the response and recovery
efforts for Hurricane Katrina, the relationship of the agencies involved,
protocols and procedures followed, and the amount of funding for the recovery
and response efforts all contributed to the exacerbation and continuation of
inequities faced by the Black community following the hurricane. One of the
failures present in the response and recovery efforts was in regards to the
relationship between the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and
the Red Cross (Koliba et al., 2011). While both organizations were present in the
areas that were most impacted by the hurricane to support the communities,
the organizations failed to clarify each of their individual roles and
responsibilities in the recovery and support efforts made. Therefore, instead of
the organizations focusing on the relief effort in the beginning of the emergency
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response, both organizations were communicating over matters regarding
procedure. Hence, hindering both organizations' efficiency to respond to the
communities who were greatly affected by the storm in a timely manner (Koliba
et al., 2011).

Another specific example of a failure in response on a systemic level in
regards to Hurricane Katrina, was the lack of responsibility by federal and state
agencies to collect, identify, and then release the bodies of victims to their
families for burial (Barry, 2006). There were roughly 1,464 deaths associated
with Hurricane Katrina (Barry, 2006). Hundreds of these victims had their
remains left on the streets, buried under debris, or could be seen floating
openly in the flooded water of New Orleans weeks after the storm occurred
(Barry, 2006). The hurricane spread victims’ bodies over miles of land, with
heat, water, and elemental exposure causing discoloration and distortion to the
bodies of victims, increasing decomposition and making them more difficult to
identify. By the time families were able to receive the bodies of their loved
ones, it had been weeks to months before they were able to have closure and
organize burials (Barry, 2006). Eventually, a disaster response group was hired
by the state to organize the collection and identification of victims of the storm,
however, the consequences for families had already been felt with prolonged
grief (Barry, 2006). This systemic failure in emergency response is a reminder
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that there is a very human element embedded in emergency management, and
it should be prioritized and treated with care and sincerity.

Communication between agencies (federal, local, etc.) during response
efforts to a major event and their capacity to deliver assistance and resources
to communities (largely determined by how that agency is funded) play a role in
how communities are able to recover from their experiences during and
following the event. These themes are also apparent in the response and
recovery efforts made towards Hurricane Sandy and Hurricane Maria, further
showing failures and successes in enacted response efforts made by agencies particularly FEMA.
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Event 2: Hurricane Sandy (2012)

On October 29th, 2012 Hurricane Sandy initially made landfall along the
coast of the states of New Jersey and New York. Over time, Hurricane Sandy built
up enough momentum to reach a category 3 hurricane status, becoming one of
the most reputable storms to hit the U.S. following Hurricane Katrina. It is
estimated that Hurricane Sandy contributed to $75 billion dollars of damage as it
traveled up the East coast, impacting a total of 12 states and regionally affecting
65,288,160 people (Census, 2012; Watkins, 2013). As Hurricane Sandy
sequentially followed Hurricane Katrina, there were differences between the
response and recovery methods made by the federal government (FEMA) and
other agencies - all made in an effort to improve emergency response following
Hurricane Katrina. Different assistance programs and practices in response
shaped the legacy that Hurricane Sandy left on the communities directly affected
by the storm and the costly destruction it brought to the United States.

After Hurricane Sandy made landfall, many governmental and local
agencies fell into action to address the situation, and unlike Hurricane Katrina,
having some organized preparedness strategies for the storm. The National
Guard and the U.S. Coast Guard were deployed, the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services provided personnel support including subjugating at least 9
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Disaster Medical Assistance Teams from across the states to provide shelters
specific for medical assistance to those in the impact area of the storm (Manuel,
2013). The American Red Cross also participated in the response effort as well by
opening close to 200 shelters in as many as 13 states impacted by Hurricane
Sandy. Alongside DHHS, FEMA provided assistance as well from the federal level.
FEMA organized 68 Disaster Recovery Centers to provide assistance for people
who needed information and help on how to receive alternative housing
(Manuel, 2013). FEMA organized these Disaster Recovery Centers across the
three main states impacted by the storm: New Jersey, New York, and
Connecticut, along with this, FEMA organized pathways for the communities
impacted by the storm to receive water and shelf ready meals. FEMA supplied
roughly 1.6 million liters of water and 2.1 million ready-to-eat meals to the
National Guard and to volunteers helping with the response effort to then
distribute to struggling communities (Watkins, 2013; Manuel, 2013).

The preparation and response to Hurricane Sandy was multifaceted with
clear documentation of the coordinated efforts of local, state, federal and nongovernmental agencies. Figure 5 (below) outlines the preparation made for the
storm before Hurricane Sandy made landfall October 29th, 2012 (Watkins, 2013).
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Figure 5: Table of Initial Preparation for Hurricane Sandy

Days before the storm hit, the residents of New Jersey and other
communities about to be impacted by Hurricane Sandy were notified of the
storm and were told to prepare for severe weather conditions, but even with
some notice given to the communities, the damage inflicted on the areas hit by
the storm was catastrophic with severe flooding, water contamination (sewage,
trash, etc.), housing and businesses lost, and power outages (Watkins, 2013). The
day following the landfall of Hurricane Sandy, President Obama formally made a
Disaster Declaration, allowing for the further mobilization of resources on the
federal level to respond to Hurricane Sandy, including the organizing of FEMA
directives and assistance programs shown in Figure 6 (Watkins, 2013).
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Figure 6: Table of Response Initiatives After Hurricane Sandy Landfall

FEMA was able to deploy over 1000 personnel to assist the recovery
effort. Alongside deploying personnel, FEMA appointed different positions for
people to respond to Hurricane Sandy and the impacted communities - one of
the many being a federal coordinating officer to assist recovery efforts in the
states impacted by Hurricane Sandy by informing residents and business owners
who experienced property losses that they could apply for federal assistance and

27

receive help doing so (Watkins, 2013).

FEMA partners with federal agencies such as the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Small Business Administration
(SBA) to provide federally declared disasters with assistance (Watkins, 2013). The
interconnections of these agencies is what determines a baseline for federal
support given to communities following a disaster status event. Some of the
specific assistance provided through these agencies are: individual and familial
financial assistance, housing assistance, transitional sheltering assistance, public
assistance, hazard mitigation assistance, and loan assistance (Watkins, 2013).
Individual and financial assistance programs are established and put into motion
to assist individuals and families who have experienced property damage or loss.
Specific individual assistance involves financial support through loans to cover
property loss/damage, grants that provide funding for temporary housing
opportunities and home repairs (Watkins, 2013). FEMA also provides access to
information and resources to communities impacted by disasters about specific
housing accessibility such as creating a housing database, known as a “housing
portal” that is a platform for disaster victims to view housing that is move-inready in an impacted area. These housing opportunities are rentable properties
that are not under lease or a sales contract, helping those affected by a disaster
event have housing to live in (Watkins, 2013). FEMA also provides communities
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affected by a disaster with transitional sheltering assistance, hazard mitigation
support, and public assistance such as providing federal based funding to local,
county, and state governments to help rebuild and replace public amenities and
promote public safety (Watkins, 2013).

While there may have been different assistance programs put in action in
response to Hurricane Sandy, studies have shown that it is still majorly
marginalized communities who were impacted negatively by the storm and its
recovery efforts. The days, weeks, and months following Hurricane Sandy
provided opportunities for assistance programs to be implemented to help the
communities impacted by the storm, some of which helped provide support
while others failed considerably on the governmental and local levels. There were
more attempts made at providing assistance to communities - particularly in the
New York area after the storm in comparison to Hurricane Katrina, however, it
does not negate the impact Hurricane Sandy has had on marginalized
communities.

Specifically regarding New York after Hurricane Sandy, studies show that
disproportionately low income communities were impacted by flooding caused
by Hurricane Sandy, communities of which were made up of majority individuals
of color (Lieberman-Cribbin et al., 2020). In such studies, it was found that
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socioeconomic characteristics have a direct correlation with flood exposure. For
example, a survey conducted within the New York and Long Island areas between
one and a half and four years after the initial impact of Hurricane Sandy showed
that “participants residing in areas of the lowest two quartiles of median
household income, experienced flooding the most often and these areas
contained the highest proportions of non-white participants and those with less
or equal to having a high school education” (Lieberman-Cribbin et al., 2020). The
lowest two median household incomes being less than $40,298 and between
$40,298 and $67,188 (Lieberman-Cribbin et al., 2020). The survey also showed
that older participants in the study resided in areas more likely to have been
exposed to flooding, while individuals who resided in areas with higher incomes
were less likely to be exposed to flooding due to Hurricane Sandy (LiebermanCribbin et al., 2020). Overall, the specific survey done in the New York, Long
Island areas indicate that in regards to emergency preparedness and response, it
needs to be viewed from an environmental justice standpoint in order to reduce
future disproportionate community exposure and long-term consequences of a
disaster event - events such as flooding (Lieberman-Cribbin et al., 2020).

While Hurricane Sandy caused much destruction and low-income
communities faced the brunt of effect of the storm, the storm itself only
exacerbated the structural and racial problems already in play experienced by
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marginalized communities (Shepard, 2015). An example of structural racism that
was already in effect before Hurricane Sandy hit the East coast - specifically in
New York - was through the implementation of “urban planning”. Urban
planning overall has negatively impacted low-income communities - particularly
those who reside along the coastal neighborhoods in New York, which are also
the communities who were mainly affected by Hurricane Sandy (Shepard, 2015).
A study was conducted to evaluate how the implementation of urban planning
prioritized development of a modern-day New York rather than providing
resources to lower income communities and development of coastal areas with
lower income prevalence (Shepard, 2015). The study overall showed that
structural racism embedded in governmental policy and lack of action to support
lower income communities is what has caused the coastal minority communities
the most harm - more than Hurricane Sandy (Shepard, 2015).

Having a strong civic and urban infrastructure is important in regards to a
community’s ability to have resistance towards environmental and climatic
influences such as a severe storm similar to Hurricane Sandy (Graham et al.,
2016). However, the impact of gentrification, governmental policy and
programming, and networks of institutional control have made it more difficult
for communities - particularly lower income communities - to have infrastructural
resistance towards climatic disasters (Graham et al., 2016). Consequently,
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experiencing a struggle in communal revitalization after a disaster event as seen
in New York, particularly regarding the Rockaway and Lower East Side
communities that were impacted significantly by Hurricane Sandy, making it that
much more imperative to have community-oriented organizations actively
engaged in prioritizing communities needs outside of governmental agencies and
programming (Graham et al., 2016).

Race and race ideology have a history of playing a role in governmental
programs, and it is important to understand how these themes negatively impact
communities of color (Elliott et al., 2020). Urban planning is one of many
programs implemented to disguise systemic racism through “community
development”, ultimately resulting in harm towards marginalized communities.
Specifically, communities of color are impacted by this implementation, as it
further alienates communities of people (marginalized and lower income) from
more privileged groups (white community).

Alongside urban planning, programs related to “climate adaptation”
became prominent after Hurricane Sandy. These programs were implemented to
seemingly help mitigate future infrastructural damage, programs such as the
voluntary federal buyout initiative that would allow for people to sell their
properties in flood prone areas in order to mitigate property and communal loss
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(Elliott et al., 2020). However, programs such as this also further alienates
marginalized communities, as more often than not, these bought-out properties
are concentrated in urban areas with the properties being owned by lower
income families and people of color. The prevalence of communities of color
utilizing the federal buyout program shows that race can and does play a role in
governmental program initiatives, as in the case of the federal buyout program, it
reinforces racial inequities regarding housing and community prevalence (Elliott
et al., 2020). Specifically, when a buyout occurs, the property would be
demolished, and particularly after Hurricane Sandy, while the buyouts occurred
in counties that were more white community dominated, the people of color
living in those neighborhoods would be more likely to accept a buyout offer,
which would further segregate people of color, and decrease communal
representation in areas where they should be welcome (Elliott et al., 2020).

Coveted programs and failures in providing resources to specifically
marginalized communities before and after Hurricane Sandy, further highlights
the ingrained systemic racism and the perpetuation of inequity that marginalized
communities continue to face both with and without the presence of
environmental emergencies (Shephard, 2015).
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Event 3: Hurricane Maria (2017)

On September 20th, 2017 Hurricane Maria initially made landfall near
Yabucoa Puerto Rico. The storm eventually reached category 5 hurricane status
and affected a population total of 3,725,789 people between Puerto Rico and the
United States Virgin Islands (Census, 2017). The storm lasted between September
20th and October 2nd, however, the lasting effects of the Hurricane have been
felt the most among the Puerto Rican community for multiple years following the
event. The Hurricane Maria Disaster event differs from Hurricane Katrina and
Hurricane Sandy in a variety of ways, not just within the response and recovery
efforts made following the event, however, also with the locality of the storm
itself and the communities impacted (Census, 2017). Hurricane Maria, unlike
Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy, impacted the U.S. territories, rather than
one or multiple of the 50 states.
One of the more significant aspects about the Hurricane Maria event was
that there was significantly less federal funding to adhere to the needs of the
Puerto Rican communities as opposed to similar disaster events that took place
in the main 50 states. In a recent study compared the response and funding for
recovery efforts of Hurricane Maria to the funding and recovery efforts made
towards Hurricane Irma and Hurricane Harvey. All three of these hurricanes
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occurred in 2017, however, the response to Hurricane Maria drastically differs
from the other two, in that the federal response to Hurricane Maria was
significantly lacking timeliness and prioritization, the cost being the furthering of
health disparities (Willison et al., 2019).
Hurricane Harvey made landfall in mid-August of 2017, overall hitting
Houston Texas the hardest, causing widespread flooding and property damage
which left thousands of people without electricity. Hurricane Irma made landfall
in the latter-half of August in 2017, mainly impacting the Caribbean Islands and
Key West in Florida. Hurricane Irma, compared to Hurricane Harvey, also caused
severe wind and electrical damage across Florida, along with millions of dollars
of damage to agricultural productivity (Willison et al., 2019).
When reviewing the federal response between Hurricane Harvey, Maria,
and Irma, the federal response to Hurricane Harvey and Hurricane Irma was not
just quicker than the response to Hurricane Maria, the federal response was also
much more vast in regards to personnel presence and funding. In the wake of all
three Hurricanes in 2017, it was Hurricane Maria that caused the most damage
in Puerto Rico in regards to housing and electricity than such damage caused by
both Hurricane Harvey and Hurricane Irma in Texas and Florida, which should
have prompted more federal support towards the response of Hurricane Maria
(Willison et al., 2019). Figure 7 below shows the FEMA financial support given to
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individuals and families comparable for each Hurricane event in 2017.

Figure 7: Distributions of Federal Financial Support after
2017’s Hurricanes made Landfall

The distribution of financial support from the government shows that
within the first two weeks that Hurricanes Harvey and Irma made landfall,
roughly 100 million dollars of financial support was given to the survivors
(individuals and families) of each hurricane, whereas with Hurricane Maria, the
survivors were given 6 million dollars of financial support within the same time
frame after Hurricane Maria made landfall (Willison et al., 2019). Two months

36

after both hurricanes Harvey and Irma made landfall, the communities impacted
by each hurricane had overall received nearly one billion dollars in recovery aid,
however, the recovery efforts of Hurricane Maria did not reach the $1 billion
amount of aid until four months after it initially made landfall. The funding
regarding the recovery efforts was delayed for numerous reasons, including the
needed conditional approval by congress of recovery plans that was not required
for the response to Hurricane Harvey and Hurricane Sandy (Willison et al., 2019).

Another important aspect of emergency response and recovery, is the
amount and consistency of personnel responding to a disaster event after its
initial impact, as rescue efforts and long-term stabilization after a disaster event
in an area are both important. In comparing Hurricane Maria to Hurricane Harvey
and Hurricane Irma in regards to personnel presence for recovery efforts, figure 8
shows the discrepancies between the recovery efforts made for each of the
hurricanes in 2017.
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Figure 8: Federal Personnel Present after the Initial Landfall

Overall, figure 8 shows that there was significantly less federal personnel
present to address the recovery of Hurricane Maria than there was to address
both Hurricane Harvey and Hurricane Irma, further showing a prioritization of
recovery of the states impacted by disaster events rather than U.S. territories
(Willison et al., 2019). Numerically, at the peak of the recovery efforts made
towards Hurricane Maria, there were roughly 19,000 federal employees on the
ground in Puerto Rico, whereas with Hurricane Harvey it was 31,000 in Texas and
Hurricane Irma 40,000 in Florida. Along with Hurricane Harvey and Hurricane
Irma’s amount of federal employee presence being larger, the personnel
mobilization was faster for each hurricane, happening within the one-month
period after both hurricanes initially made landfall (Willison et al., 2019).
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The lack of timeliness of response towards Hurricane Maria combined with
less financial support and personnel presence after the hurricane, along with the
need for there to be conditional approval made by congress for recovery plans
made for Hurricane Maria, made a significant impact on the Puerto Rican
communities affected by the hurricane in comparison to the communities
impacted by Hurricane Harvey and Hurricane Irma. Overall, there were many
more deaths associated with Hurricane Maria than there were with Hurricane
Harvey and Hurricane Maria, shown by figure 9 (Willison et al., 2019).

Figure 9: Morality associated with the 2017 Hurricanes
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The indirect deaths associated with Hurricane Maria, approximately 2975
deaths, was caused by the ineffective federal response to the storm, and further
highlights the racism present in emergency situations and the responses to them.
Based on the study, the risk of death due to Hurricane Maria was observed to be
45% higher, and along with the higher risk, it was shown that those living in areas
with low socioeconomic development were mainly impacted by the storm and
consequently susceptible to this higher mortality rate (Willison et al, 2019).
Those affected by Hurricane Maria were communities not only of minority status,
however, also those who experienced an exacerbation of already existing
inequities (e.g. racism, classism) by the hurricane occurring specifically in Puerto
Rico, a U.S. territory and not one of the 50 states (Willison et al., 2019).

Although the study by Willison et al. focused on the comparison between
Hurricane Maria, Hurricane Harvey, and Hurricane Irma, storms that occurred in
2017, there are similarities to be noted between Hurricanes Maria, Katrina, and
Sandy. In the federal responses made towards Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane
Sandy, and Hurricane Maria, there are aspects of each that show failures in
federal response regarding timeliness, organization, and funding; however, there
is a clear difference in regards to Hurricane Maria, in that the storm hit an area
that was considered a U.S. territory rather than one of the 50 states. Overall, the
response to Hurricane Maria in comparison to Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane
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Sandy show that the locality of a disaster event should not matter in regards to
the type of response and recovery aid given to communities affected by disaster
events, as shown with all three events it is minority and lower income
communities who are most negatively affected by the disasters themselves and
the ineffective response practices.
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Conclusion
By studying historic disasters both environmental and socio-economically
related, failures in emergency response and protocol can be observed, creating
a pathway to address response biases, shortcomings, and discriminatory
practices. What is learned from studying these issues, can help create better
emergency response practices through initiating awareness training for
emergency response personnel that focuses on past failures and successes in
emergency management on a federal level, which can hopefully mitigate future
indignant and oppressive institutional practices. Outlined below are suggestions
for an awareness training program that highlights and summarizes the failures in
emergency response discussed within this thesis and remedies for them.

Awareness Training
This awareness training outline will be catered to emergency management
personnel focused on past success and failures in institutional based emergency
management practices in meeting the needs of marginalized communities in past
disaster responses. For an effective training program, there should be training
learning objectives, a training program timeline, an agenda, and a description of
training sessions and tasks needed to complete the program as a whole. It should
be noted that this thesis only provides suggestions for possible sessions in an
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awareness training program in order for the ideals outlined to be easily applied
to possible, alreading existing training programs within the emergency
management field.

Possible Sequential Sessions in an
Emergency Management Based Awareness Training Program:
1. Session One
Description: Session one will focus on the relationship between communities
and emergency management. This section will highlight goals associated with
emergency management and discuss the historical interactions emergency
management personnel have had with communities and potential harm done.
Example 1 of a harmful interaction: Hurricane Katrina is known to be
one of the worst natural disaster events to occur in the United States,
and while many people were impacted, it was mainly the Black
population - specifically in the Southern region of the U.S. (Louisiana)
that was impacted by the storm. Even long after Hurricane Katrina, the
Black population in New Orleans has not been revitalized to its
previous state due to a lack of timeliness of federal response to the
storm and lack of accessible housing programs and consistent financial
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assistance available to communities most affected by the storm
(Census, 2015).
Example 2 of a harmful interaction: Hurricane Maria sequentially
followed Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Sandy, and at least two
other hurricanes (Hurricane Harvey and Irma), however, even with
improvements in emergency response since Hurricane Katrina, the
mortality rate of specifically the Puerto Rican communities was
significantly higher due to a lack of timely response and a lack of
consistent along with voluminous federal assistance (Willison et al.,
2019).
Example goal: Reasonable emergency response and recovery practices
aims to includes the prioritization of equity and timeliness in
addressing community needs after a disaster event occurrence
➢ This goal could be expanded by an institution to include a
timeline with benchmarks describing a reasonable timeframe
for that institution to provide resources to communities. These
resources could include temporary housing, loan forgiveness
programs, and financial assistance based on individual and
familial needs (such as if they have insurance, have a low
income, among other criteria).
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2. Session Two
Description: Session two will focus on the impact of institutional racism and
specific harmful practices within emergency management. Session two will
emphasize how intention does not negate someone or a group's impact on
communities. - access to housing, grocery stores, proactive programs, loan
forgiveness, etc.
Example 1 of racism in emergency management: Hurricane Katrina
caused devastating damage to communities in regards to housing,
access to grocery stores, businesses, employment, and pharmacies.
Instead of federal support going towards remedying the damage and
replacing these vital resources, there was an upheaval in the building
of restaurants and hotels following the storm instead of permanent
housing and other communal necessities (Census, 2015).
Example 2 of racism in emergency management: Hurricane Sandy was
one of the first major storms to occur after Hurricane Katrina, and
while it impacted a variety of communities, it was still mainly
communities of color that were most impacted by the storm, as the
storm exacerbated existing inequalities. This exacerbation was shown
through the flooding that occurred as a result of the storm as the
damage it caused was costly. The areas in which hurricane induced
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flooding was most impactful and damaging, were areas dominated by
non-white, lower income communtities (Lieberman-Cribbin et al.,
2020). The flood damage creates more expense along with basic
necessities such as food, rent, and medical insurance, making it more
difficult to live without hardship (Lieberman-Cribbin et al., 2020).
3. Session Three
Description: Session three will focus on how to remedy harmful practices in
emergency management, along with how to continually address discriminatory
actions within emergency response. Session three will also discuss
intersectionality and positionality within institutions on both an individual
worker level and as an institution as a whole.
Example 1 of remediation: Provide continual support programs through
the federal government to assist the communities most susceptible to
hardships after a disaster event occurs in an area. These programs can
include both financial assistance programs, scholarships, affordable
housing programs, SNAP programs (affordable food plans), along with
others.
Example 2 of remediation: Change emergency response protocols and
procedures that have historically been harmful and discriminatory
towards specifically marginalized populations and attempt new ones
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based on community needs and feedback.
Example 3 of remediation: Make anti-racism and intersectionality based
training a requirement for emergency management personnel and
institutions.
Post-training Discussion Questions:
1. How is systemic racism and systematic procedural practices in
emergency response impacting the health equity and development of
marginalized communities?
2. How do emergency response procedures and protocols followed uphold
systems of oppression?
3. How can we better improve emergency response and recovery to better
address communal health and inequities?
4. What are some positive and recent changes in emergency management
that promotes equity in emergency recovery and response?
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